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El Kosheh
Despite the sensitivity of the Coptic issue, the events of August 1998 (and similarly those of Demian, etc.) presented a suitable opportunity for the Egyptian authorities to renew their commitment to human rights and the right of equal citizenship. This opportunity however was lost with the renewal of the senseless propaganda campaign using the rationale that democracy and human rights must be sacrificed during national conflicts in order to address both internal and external threats. The authorities thereby disregarded the fact that putting an end to such violations and abiding with the standards agreed to by Egypt to protect human rights are essential for overcoming the scheming of conspirators and trouble makers who wish to stir up sectarian tensions. During the past thirty years the state has been giving a free hand to extremist religious groups, thereby helping to create this new atmosphere of religious intolerance, which in turn has ended in grave sectarian tension. This was demonstrated in the violence that erupted in Al Khanka in 1972, and was followed by a series of events leading up to those of El Kohseh I n1999. Directly following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 there followed, during the first years of President Mubarak's government, a period of guarded calm. However the failure to actively address the roots of the problem with its economic, cultural and social ramifications led to a progressive increase in violence - a violence that went beyond even previous forms of discrimination against Christians and extended to include writers, authors and intellectuals in general. This was accompanied by the weakness of the media and the negative attitude taken by most civil society groups who failed in their role of re-building public awareness (admittedly the tools for doing so are scarce and inefficient). The State thus neglected the improvement of the electoral process - the only mechanism enabling the participation of civilians in public affairs. It did not heed the repeated requests and constitutional guarantees calling for an end to the State of Emergency, in place since 1981, and that has now come to be used as a parallel constitution to the official national constitution. Given its legal structure and the restriction of the rights of expression, peaceful association and rotation of authority, this state of emergency has in effect paralyzed the activities of the different political parties, as well as all civil society organizations. The State has likewise allowed the spread of violence through the absence of sufficient legal measures against torture. The policies of the Egyptian Government that do not probe into the root causes of our social problems have led us to an atrocity such as that of El Kosheh. During the mission carried out by the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) to the village, it transpired from eyewitnesses' accounts that there is a strong link between the bloody events of December 1999 and those that occurred fifteen months ago. This was made clear on two levels: Firstly, The failure of the public prosecutor and those in positions of authority in the ministry of Interior to carry out their duties following the events of August 1998 and take the necessary legal steps at the right time. As a result of a number of articles being published in foreign newspapers, the authorities responded by harassing Egyptian human rights organizations and arresting the Secretary General of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights after their publishing a report on the torture experienced by a large number of villagers from El Kosheh at the hands of police forces. Instead of the authorities concerning themselves over the atrocious torturing of a large number of citizens detained merely on suspicion of involvement in the death of two Christian youths, they were instead busy running media campaigns at home and abroad. This took priority over bringing to justice those officials who were derelict in their duties, in blatant contravention of the constitution, the Penal code, and international agreements on human rights. It is clear from this behavior that the one aim of the authorities was the cover up of crimes committed by some police officers at whatever cost. Secondly, No attempt was made to look into the possibility that the murder of the two Copts was the result of a revenge killing carried out by a Muslim family. In such a case the excessive measures taken by the police against the villagers could have been aimed at excluding this theory by incriminating Christian civilians for fear of how it would otherwise be portrayed in the Western media. As usual, the security measures used by the government authorities failed to be effective in the latest El Kosheh incident. The events themselves were triggered off on the evening of Friday the 31st of December 1999, at which time police forces were present in the village. Moreover the bloody skirmishes that resulted in 20 murders and about 35 injuries by gunfire occurred approximately 48 hours following the arrival of the police forces at the entrances to the village and on the village streets. The security forces are without a doubt responsible for the aggravation of the situation that lead to the death and injury of so many citizens. Had the officials in charge learned their lesson from the dramatic build up of events in Kafr El Demian in 1996, it would have been possible to avoid what took place in El-Kosheh. The disastrous sequence of events began with some confrontations on Friday evening, which could, had the necessary steps been taken, have ended there. We therefore ask the Minister of Interior to explain to our frustrated and embittered public the following: · How such a large number of firearms was found in the hands of ordinary citizens. · Why, since Friday 31st of December, has there not been a thorough combing of El Kosheh and neighboring countries to confiscate these unlicensed weapons. · How was it that these bloody confrontations occurred with the security forces standing by? Finally, the executive and governmental authorities in the Sohag and Dar El Salam city are called upon to make public all preventive and reformative measures that have been adopted following the El Kosheh incidents of 1998. Highlights of AHRLA's visit to El Kosheh AHRLA sent a fact-finding mission to El Kosheh following the December events; The mission was stopped at a police checkpoint in the village of Koala (50 km north of El Kosheh on the main road leading to the village). On meeting the officer in charge, AHRLA members presented a letter, in the name of the Association, directed to the authorities and the head of security as well as the governor of Sohag. The letter was a petition for the security officials to facilitate AHRLA's mission and allow its members to reach the victims involved in the incident and offer their support and legal services. The official in charge however refused to allow the mission through, insisting they turn back to Sohag city. Upon requesting the advice of locals living in the area AHRLA members ascertained there was another possible route to reach El Kosheh, through the mountains. The mission was warned of the dangers of such an endeavor, but given the lack of alternatives, proceeded on. After over two hours the mission finally arrived at Dar Al Salam city (2 Km north of El Kosheh) and was stopped once again at a police checkpoint. Here however the officer in charge was somewhat reassured after reading the papers AHRLA members presented him with, and agreed to them continuing on their way provided he accompanied them to the police chief of El Kosheh to speak with him first. With the mission's arrival at the northern entrance of El Kosheh, and the central Port Said road, the destruction of large numbers of shops and wooden kiosks became apparent. There was nobody on the streets and the houses themselves seemed deserted. The only people about were heavily armed police agents with their weapons directed at the windows and rooftops along the street, as if in preparation for battle. All attempts to meet with the administrative officer at Al Kosheh failed. The mission returned to Dar El Salam city, accompanied by a security agent, in order to procure an official pass from the police commissioner there. On the way to Dar El Salam there was an extensive security presence surrounding the mission's vehicle, so that it could hardly be seen from the outside. Once in Dar El Salam police station, AHRLA members asked to meet with the police commissioner there. They were met instead by his Deputy who informed them they had to wait for the Chief Commissioner to arrive, meanwhile refusing to give out any information on the real number of victims or the true nature of what had occurred. After two hours of waiting, and after the Head of Security at Sohag having received AHRLA's letter, the mission members decided to enter El Kosheh by any means possible. Once again, the mission arrived at the northern entrance of El Kosheh. This time it coincided with an official delegation on its way to the village, headed by Major General Mustafa Abdel Kader, Minister of Local Administration. It was then possible to join up with a number of journalists following the delegation and enter the village in that way. The AHRLA members attended two meetings organized by the official delegation. The first was at the El Sebakat family home and included representatives of Muslim families, while the second took place at the El Malak church and included priests and some Christian families. In both meetings the Minister spoke of the need to stop exaggerating events and the importance of national unity. He offered both sides his condolences and hopes for the early recovery of those injured. As the official mission left the village the village the Christian inhabitants raised black banners across the streets and on their windowsills in demonstration of their grief. The AHRLA mission then proceeded to the Dar El Salam Public Prosecutor's office. One of the lawyers on the team met with the General Prosecutor and presented him with an official offer by AHRLA to defend those accused in the El Kosheh events, and likewise requested to inspect the evidence gathered so far. This was however refused on the grounds that the police was still at the stage of gathering evidence and that the real investigation had not yet started (this despite the fact that the newspapers were issuing daily news on the investigations of the public prosecution). To avoid an escalation f the situation, the mission's lawyer informed the general prosecutor of an address where he could be reached so as to be informed of the dates when the accused would be questioned. Upon the mission's return to Sohag village it went straight to the Sohag training hospital (adjacent to the faculty of Medicine). No hospital official would agree to meet with the mission, but one of the nurses directed its members to where the injured were being treated. At the entrance of the room where the injured were, there were a number of police officers who prevented the mission's doctor from entering to meet any of the injured or gather any information. One of the policemen even went as far as starting a brawl with the mission members. By examining the Emergency room's entry book, mission members found hat all injuries were due to shootings and hat the dates of admission started from the morning of 1/1/2000 until the evening of 3/1/2000 (see appendix number 1). All officials at the hospital refused to give out any data concerning the exact events or make official the real number of murdered or injured. Eyewitness accounts to AHRLA mission: A lawyer holding a public seat in the Dar El Salam court:
A Lawyer meeting with AHRLA's mission immediately following its return: "The initial incident between the Christian merchant and Muslim woman does not in any way justify the grave development of events that followed - why did the Muslim villagers break up and burn the shops of Christian merchants? Why did the security forces present at the entrance of the village and in its streets not prevent the assault on the Copts? How can the murder and injury of so many Copts from this country be allowed? And why weren't the executive and governmental authorities at Dar Al Salam and El Kosheh changed after it became known that they were accomplices in what happened to Copts in August 1998? And whoever claims that the Copts opened fire must explain the ratio of murdered and injured on both sides. Some newspapers published reports of accounts taken from injured Muslims who claimed that Copts used to stop cars and call out "Khawagat stay and Muslims get down" whereupon they would begin to beat up the Muslims. ('Khawaga' to an Egyptian from Upper Egypt is an insult). These accounts are naïve and false." Five Christian witnesses who refused to give their names: "The Radwan family holds all the positions of authority in the Sohag Governorate and Dar Il Salam city. This creates problems during and after any elections, given that El Kosheh comes under that province. For instance, even though we resorted to the judiciary, we did not succeed in removing the wooden kiosks owned by Muslims and built illegally outside our shops. Where are the rights of civilians then?" The witnesses were asking if it was acceptable that in such a highly populated village the only school present should be built with wooden board? They also claimed that the close kinship between those in positions of authority allows for the real perpetrators to avoid punishment. "The latest events in El Khosheh are related to both those of August 1998 and to previous incidents. The gunfire that occurred at the entrances and exits of El Kosheh was caused, not by El Kosheh inhabitants, but from inhabitants from Awlad Tok Gharb and Awlad Salem villages. How else could we explain the murdered and injured found in the farms around El Kosheh. It is well known how many weapons the citizens own. Rumors were being spread from Friday evening and all through Saturday - when police forces were already present. So how is it possible hat so many were injured and killed?" One Christian eyewitness' account to AHRLA: The eyewitness refused to speak of the painful details of events, and stressed only the importance of addressing the root causes. Some of his suggestions are summarized as follows: · Better choice of security agents from the village itself, as one of the reasons for the bloodshed was the presence of various corrupt agents who failed to carry out their duty. · Bringing to trial all officers who did not carry out their responsibilities in defending Christian and Muslim citizens during the violence that erupted. · Bringing to trial the Mayors, Sheikhs and agents working in Dar Il Salam city given their knowledge of all current occurrences, and consequently able to prevent such events from escalating. Notes on the eyewitnesses' depositions: From the different eyewitness accounts, the following common details were agreed upon: 1) Reactions to actual events were momentary and spontaneous, and what led to the situation deteriorating were the provoking rumors that were spread. Not one of the eyewitnesses spoke of a pre-arranged plot, or conspiracy. 2) Serious questions were raised concerning the role of the police forces from Friday until Sunday. 3) A number of Christian homes were broken into. 4) The violence spread to seven nearby villages: Dar Il Salam, Nage Mousa, Al Nosiran, Baramar, El Naghamesh, Awlad Kalaf, and Awlad Touk Gharb. 5) The violence outside El Kosheh was directed exclusively against Copts, their shops and some of their offices and clinics. 6) Twenty people were murdered, with between 32 and 35 injured and over 85 people detained. 7) The Governmentally issued licenses to Muslims to build wooden kiosks in front of Christian shops is the root cause of the permanent tensions that began ever since August 1998. 8) Absence of essential services such as schools and hospitals in the El Kosheh village. This was explained as being the result of the village coming under the administrative authority of Dar Il Salam. 9) There have been ongoing tensions between the two communities ever since August 1998. There are two interpretations for this: Firstly: The Muslims of El Kosheh feel unjustly done by ever since the events of 1998. They claim that in any dispute with Copts from the village, all governmental authorities and police are careful to appease the Christian party involved out of fear of rumors of persecution. Secondly: The Copts of El Kosheh felt helpless until the events of August 1998. Since then they reported that matters have improved somewhat. Appendix 1 The mission tried seriously to obtain any official data from security officials at Dar El Salam police station, the public prosecutor, Sohag educational hospital, and from the injured themselves, but all our efforts failed. Data was obtained from the following: 1. from the daybook of the emergency unit of Sohag educational hospital (names of injured). 2. Eyewitness reports, according to which eighteen people were killed (names of Christians murdered). 3. National and opposition newspapers First list (the Injured)
· Morgue workman at Sohag educational hospital mentioned the presence of the unknown cadaver. All the injuries resulted from gunfire. Second List (the Murdered)
· Neither officials nor citizens would tell the mission the name of the killed Muslim, or any details about him. · All fatal injuries resulted from gunfire. Third list (Injured) reviewed, corrected
2 - Fahmy Awad Fahmy 3 - Ezzat Wanees Ghattas 4 - Nabil Samy Seif 5 - Yosry Abdel Masseh Mikhael 6 - Thrwat Labib Shenoda 7 - Ashraf Halem Estefanoos 8 - Moawad Shenoda Moawad 9 - Morkos Shenode Gerges 10- Marzouk Fakhry Armesia 11- Matta Rofaeel Attia 12- Badee Mahros Ibrahim 13- Aziz Shafek Atallah 14- Morkos Roshdy Gendy 15- Adel Gaber Abdel Megeed 16- Al Nemerey Younes Abbas 17- Eetemad Mekhaeel Labib 18- Samara Sharkawy Wanees 19- Abou El Fadl Abou El Kasem Ibrahim 20- Ahmed Aly Ebeed 21- Sebaey Abdel Maksoud Soliman 22- Mohammed Ragab Mohammed. · National and opposition newspapers differed in the published names and number of injured. · No official statements from governmental authorities included the names of injured. Epilogue:- The Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA)- in dealing with El Kosheh events December 1999 - renews its condemnation to the all types of violence whatever its causes. It also insists that dealing with sectarian violence cannot be carried out by concealing facts, and denying possible reasons for its occurrence. Informing the public with details, causes and motives of the problems can consolidate the adherence of the different social groups and civic society organizations to eradicate the roots of violence, religious fanaticism and sectarian hatred. In this context AHRLA stresses the necessity for policies aimed at ensuring democratic and human rights values, and the observance of the constitution. AHRLA likewise calls for a total review of the educational and media programs to reflect the religious, cultural, political and social diversity of the nation. This is essential for the promotion of tolerance, in the face of growing religious fanaticism. There is a need to explain the wide participation of citizens from the El Kosheh and surrounding villages in the sectarian violence. AHRLA holds the State responsible for the present impasse, which is a dangerous threat to our national unity. The Association calls for total support for civil society's efforts through the different organizations to protest this terrible violation of human rights, and to urge the government to take the necessary preventive, reformative, and legal steps in order to ensure that these tragic events will never again repeat themselves. |
